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This paper computes the steady-state optimal rate of inflation in a model with monopolistic compe-
tition under two different sticky-price specifications, Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980). The optimal
rate of inflation is positive and almost identical to the ratio between the rate of discount and the
Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to calculate the optimal steady-state rate of inflation in economies
with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. To this purpose, two standard types of slow price-
adjustment specifications are introduced in a deterministic framework: Calvo (1983) partial adjust-
ment based on fixed probabilities, and Taylor (1980) staggered price contracts.
We calculate the inflation rate that maximizes welfare in steady state. Our optimality analysis is
based on the steady-state link between inflation and the mark-up of prices over the marginal cost of
production. This mark-up is recognized as a source of economic inefficiency that stems from monop-
olistic competition.1 Therefore, the rate of inflation that maximizes the utility of the representative
household is also the one that minimizes the mark-up in steady state.
Remarkably, we find that the optimal rate of inflation in steady state is approximately equal to the
ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. This result is robust for different
schemes and degrees of price stickiness. In addition, we compute and compare the welfare cost of
steady-state inflation for Calvo and Taylor specifications, and find different welfare losses.
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acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (research project
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1See King and Wolman (1996, 1999) and Khan et al. (2003).
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2. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND STICKY PRICES IN STEADY STATE
The production sector of the economy has a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms as in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), each of them producing a differentiated good in a deterministic environment.
Thus, firm i sets the price Pt(i) in period t, and the amount of output that will sell, yt(i), is given by







where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, Pt is the aggregate price
level, and yt is aggregate output.
Production technology follows a Cobb-Douglas function that combines capital and labor, with
0 < α < 1 as the output elasticity with respect to capital. Both capital and labor are obtained in










where wt is the real wage and r
k
t is the real cost of renting capital.
2.1. Optimal Price Under Calvo Scheme
Following Calvo (1983), in every period there is a constant probability η that firms will not be able
to change prices. Let β = (1 + ρ)−1 be the deterministic discount factor, where ρ > 0 is the discount

















which leads to the following optimal price in a steady state with a constant trend inflation rate, π,





1 − βη(1 + π)θ−1
1 − βη(1 + π)θ
]
Ptmc (1)
2.2. Optimal Price Under Taylor Scheme
Alternatively, let us assume that firms can adjust prices with a constant frequency as proposed by
Taylor (1980). In particular, firms decide new prices every J periods, remaining unchanged meanwhile.























1 − βJ(1 + π)Jθ
1 − βJ(1 + π)J(θ−1)
1 − β(1 + π)θ−1




3.1. Inflation and Mark-ups
Firm market power results in a mark-up of prices over marginal costs, which creates a wedge
between the marginal productivities of inputs and their corresponding marginal payments. Conse-
quently, the equilibrium levels of capital and labor turn lower with a higher mark-up. This distortion
stemming from monopolistic competition motivates the search for economic policies to reduce the
mark-up and improve the aggregate economic activity. Specifically, this paper looks for the inflation
rate that maximizes welfare in a deterministic (long-run) framework, which is the one that minimizes
the mark-up in steady state.
Hence, we derive the steady-state mark-up depending on inflation for the two alternative sticky-
price schemes described in the previous section. By looking at equations (1) and (2), we notice that the
optimal price, Pt(i), is equal to the product of the firm-level mark-up and the nominal marginal cost,
Ptmc. Comparing (1) and (2), we see that the firm-level mark-up can be decomposed into its common
component, θ/(θ − 1), and a specific component that depends on the price stickiness parameter (η
and J , respectively, in the Calvo and Taylor specifications).
If we multiply both sides of equations (1) and (2) by Pt/Pt(i), we find the aggregate price level
as a proportion, µt > 1, of the nominal marginal cost: Pt = µtPtmc. Therefore, µt is the aggregate





1 − βη(1 + π)θ−1









1 − βJ(1 + π)Jθ
1 − βJ(1 + π)J(θ−1)
1 − β(1 + π)θ−1





which present the aggregate mark-up as the product of the firm-level mark-up and price dispersion
between aggregate and optimal prices, Pt/Pt(i).
2 Likewise, the definitions of the aggregate price levels











2With positive trend inflation, π > 0, the ratio Pt/Pt(i) is lower than one in steady state. Furthermore, a higher π








1 − (1 + π)J(θ−1)




Inserting equations (5) and (6) into (3) and (4), respectively, allows us to write down a constant
aggregate mark-up, as a function of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity parameter θ, the discount factor β,





1 − βη(1 + π)θ−1
1 − βη(1 + π)θ
[
1 − η







1 − βJ(1 + π)Jθ
1 − βJ(1 + π)J(θ−1)
1 − β(1 + π)θ−1




1 − (1 + π)J(θ−1)




Equations (7) and (8) provide the impact of trend inflation, π, on the steady-state aggregate
mark-up, µ. There are competing effects on the firm-level mark-up and price dispersion: a positive
steady-state inflation rises the firm-level mark-up while it lowers the value of P/P (i) by increasing the
distance between optimal and aggregate prices. The higher firm-level mark-up is explained because
firms anticipate future inflation and set a higher current optimal price in a forward-looking strategy
with price stickiness. Hence, the overall impact of positive trend inflation on the aggregate mark-up
depends on the net effect between a higher firm-level mark-up and a lower P/P (i). As documented
below, we find that increasing π from 0% reduces the mark-up because the price dispersion effect is
stronger than the impact on the firm-level mark-up. In turn, optimal steady-state inflation is positive.
3.2. Staggered Prices, the Optimal Steady-State Inflation and Welfare
The optimal steady-state inflation is the one that minimizes µ in equation (7) for the Calvo model
and in equation (8) for the Taylor model.3 Assuming that a time period corresponds to one quarter,
Table 1 reports the optimal inflation rates for the cases ρ = [0.005, 0.01] and θ = [4, 6, 10], within both
the Calvo and the Taylor specifications and different degrees of price stickiness. Let Q be the average
number of quarters without price adjustment so that the cases η = [0.5, 0.75, 0.875] and J = [2, 4, 8]
represent three situations for both models in which prices are optimized semi-annually, annually and
biannually. Table 1 compares the optimal annualized inflation to 400ρ/θ. Notably, optimal annualized
inflation can be fairly well approximated by the ratio 400ρ/θ, with both sticky-price schemes and for
any degree of price stickiness.
To provide additional evidence, Figure 1 displays the annualized per-cent optimal steady-state rate
of inflation, in both the Calvo and Taylor specifications, fixing Q = 4 for a reasonable range of values
of ρ and θ. Lines almost overlap, which confirms that optimal inflation is close to ρ/θ independently
3As shown in the Supplementary material, no tractable analytical solution for optimal inflation can be derived from
the corresponding optimality conditions and numerical methods have been used for its computation.
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ρ = 0.005 and θ = 4 ρ = 0.005 and θ = 6 ρ = 0.005 and θ = 10
Calvo Taylor 400ρθ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ
Q=2 0.5015 0.4974 0.5000 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=4 0.5055 0.4974 0.5000 0.3373 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=8 0.5135 0.4974 0.5000 0.3413 0.3333 0.3333 0.2052 0.2012 0.2000
ρ = 0.01 and θ = 4 ρ = 0.01 and θ = 6 ρ = 0.01 and θ = 10
Calvo Taylor 400ρθ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ Calvo Taylor 400
ρ
θ
Q=2 1.0060 0.9979 1.0000 0.6736 0.6656 0.6666 0.4054 0.3973 0.4000
Q=4 1.0220 0.9979 1.0000 0.6816 0.6656 0.6666 0.4094 0.3973 0.4000
Q=8 1.0540 0.9979 1.0000 0.7057 0.6656 0.6666 0.4254 0.3973 0.4000
Table 1: Optimal Annual Rates of Inflation (%) for Different Sticky-Price Specifications
from the pricing scheme. Let us discuss the economic intuition of this result.
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Figure 1: Optimal Rate of Inflation in Steady State (annualized, %)
An increase in the rate of discount, ρ, reduces the present value of future variables. The effects
of anticipated future inflation for current price setting are smaller, the optimal price is lower and the
firm-level mark-up falls. Since ρ has no influence on price dispersion, P/P (i) does not change, and the
aggregate mark-up gets affected only by the reduction of firm-level mark-up. Consequently, a higher
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trend inflation delivers the minimum value of aggregate mark-up.
An increase in the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity, θ, reduces firm market power and profits. More compe-
tition among firms brings less price dispersion and the wedge between optimal and aggregate prices
narrows down. This rises the ratio P/P (i) and the decline of the aggregate mark-up due to higher
trend inflation is weaker. Subsequently, the optimal rate of inflation is lower with higher Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity. In the limit case, as θ approaches infinity (perfectly competitive industry), optimal steady-
state inflation is null.


































Figure 2: Welfare Cost of Steady-State Inflation (annualized, %)
The welfare analysis is conducted assuming standard household behavior as described in Aguilera-
Bravo and Casares (2019). There is a CRRA utility function with consumption and labor elasticities
at 1.25 and 2, respectively. Households discount future utility at a constant rate ρ = 0.005, which
implies a 2% annualized rate of discount. The rate of capital depreciation is 2.5% per quarter and
α = 0.36 in the production function. The Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity is θ = 6, which implies a mark-up
of prices over the marginal cost approximately equal to 20%. The welfare cost is computed as the
percent of output that represents the consumption equivalence when deviating from optimal inflation.
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Figure 2 shows that for all the degrees of price rigidity considered, and with either Calvo or Taylor
rigidities, there is a u-shaped pattern representing the welfare cost of steady-state inflation. In other
words, household utility is maximized at some positive annualized rate of inflation very close to
400ρ/θ = 0.33%. Therefore, the degree of price stickiness in either model has very little effect on the
optimal rate of inflation in steady state. Nevertheless, Calvo sticky prices entail significantly larger
welfare loses than Taylor staggered prices because the mark-up increases much more rapidly when
steady-state inflation moves from its optimal value.4 The numbers displayed in Figure 2 are rather
small due to the narrow interval of inflation rates considered.5
Finally, the negative impact of price rigidities on household welfare is also revealed in Figure 2.
For a given inflation rate, the longer the average time without adjusting prices, Q, the larger the
welfare cost. This effect is observed in both Calvo and Taylor schemes.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have computed the welfare-maximizing rate of inflation in the steady state of
a monopolistic competition model under two different sticky-price specifications: Calvo (1983) fixed
probability and Taylor (1980) staggered contracts. The maximum welfare is obtained at a steady-state
rate of inflation that leads to the minimum mark-up. This optimal rate of inflation is positive due
to the eroding effect of higher price dispersion on the aggregate mark-up. We find that the optimal
inflation is accurately approximated by the ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity. This result is robust to changes in either the pricing scheme or the level of price stickiness.
Additionally, we report a larger welfare cost of steady-state inflation under Calvo pricing than
under Taylor contracts, which increases with price stickiness.
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